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6.1Introduction
The recent merger wave in the United States has left observers at-
tempting to uncover explanations for its strength and persistence. Some
have suggested that tax factors have played an' important role. Indeed,
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 contained several provisions, not effective
until the beginning of 1987, that were aimed specifically at reducing
the tax advantages available through merger. In two previous papers
(Auerbach and Reishus 1988a; 1988b), we estimated the tax benefits
generated by 318 mergers and takeovers that took place in this country
over the years 1968—83, and we considered whether the level and type
of tax benefits available affected the structure of the merger transac-
tions. Our findings suggested that although tax benefits did not appear
• to be important in the majority of transactions involving large, public
p corporations, in a significant minority of transactions the benefits ap-
peared significant enough to play a role in the decision to merge.
By focusing exclusively on mergers that occurred, we were able to
estimate the size of the tax benefits involved but not the role that these
benefits played in the actual merger process. The presence of such
benefits is a necessary condition for tax factors to influence merger
activity, but not a sufficient one. Because the issues involved in chang-
ing the ownership and management of a company are extremely com-
plex, it is entirely possible that tax benefits, even if significant, come
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into play only "at the margin" once other conditions have been sat-
isfied. Thus, it remains unclear whether the tax benefits received by
merging firms represent more than simple transfers to the parties in-
volved, or in other words whether the frequency and pattern of take-
overs has been significantly influenced by the availability of the tax
benefits.
This paper aims to resolve this question by comparing the sample
of mergers we previously analyzed with "pseudomergers," ones that
did not occur, drawn from random combinations of firms in a broad
sample of U.S. corporations. By estimating a "marriage model" based
on the differences between mergers that occurred and those that did
not, we are able to discern whether the tax benefits observed in the
mergers that took place were available with the same size and frequency
in the population as a whole (conditional on other factors), or whether
the tax benefits were larger than would have occurred by chance, as
would be true if tax factors increased the likelihood of a merger.
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section dis-
cusses the tax treatment of mergers and acquisitions and what the
potential tax benefits of a merger are. Section 6.3 describes our merger
sample, the findings we previously reported on the tax benefits from
these mergers, and the relationship of such benefits to the structure of
the transactions. Section 6.4 outlines the underlying model of merger
activity that we use to generate the multinomial logit specification of
the merger decision, as well as how we deal with the estimation problem
introduced by the large number of alternative mergers in which a firm
could engage. Section 6.5 describes the sampling procedure used to
create the sample of pseudomergers and the calculation of variables
used in the estimation; section 6.6 presents the empirical estimates
themselves. The final section offers some brief conclusions concerning
the implications of the recent tax law changes for the level of merger
activity.
6.2The Tax Benefits of Merger Activity
There are several different ways that companies may reduce taxes
through a merger or acquisition, and tax benefits can accrue at both c
the corporate and the shareholder level. In some cases the tax benefits
from a corporate combination are also available through other means,
and these benefits should therefore not necessarily be attributed to the
merger process. The following description, except where noted, applies t
to the law in force before 1987, during the years when the mergers in a
our sample occurred. r
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6.2.1Corporate Taxation
There are three types of potential corporate tax benefits associated
with the combination of two public corporations: increased utilization
of tax loss and tax credit carryforwards, increased depreciation de-
ductions obtained by stepping up the basis of assets, and increased
interest deductions associated with an increase in the debt-equity ratio
of the combined enterprise.
Tax Losses and Credits
Under the tax law, both present and past, corporations with negative
taxable income may claim tax refunds based on these losses only to
the extent of the previous three years' taxable income (net of inter-
vening losses). Any additional losses must be carried forward, without
interest, until the firm has taxable income sufficient to offset themor
until they expire, now after 15 years and before 1981 after 5 years.
Estimates in Auerbach and Poterbá (1987) and Altshuler and Auerbach
(1987) suggested that for the average large corporation experiencing
tax losses, the present value of tax refunds so deferred is on the order
of half their face value, because of deferral and expiration. Because
both of these studies derived estimates from samples of firms that
continued to operate independently, they may have overstated the true
population average, since one would expect disappearance from the
sample to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of becoming
taxable in the near future.
Further restrictions exist on the use of investment tax credits. Until
1977 firms could offset at most half of their taxable income, alter de-
duction of losses carried back and forward, with investment tax credits.
o (Thisfraction rose to .85 by 1982.) Altshuler and Auerbach estimated
that the number of firms paying taxes but carrying credits forward was
even larger than the number of firms carrying losses forward and paying
no taxes. The size of these tax benefits can be substantial. Auerbach
and Poterba found several cases of firms carrying forward losses with
a face value of tax refunds in excess of the firm's equity value, sug-
gesting not only that these firms had very low values as the result of
poor performance, but also that the market did not expect them to
obtain close to the full face value of the tax benefits.
Combination with a "fully" taxable firm that has no tax losses and
the potential to absorb more credits than it is currently claiming can
increase the value of such a firm's tax benefits. Under prior law, a
taxable firm could offset the losses and credits of an acquired firm
against its own current and future income, subject to the usual expi-
ration provisions and a variety of additional limitations that varied with160 AlanJ. AuerbachandDavid Reishus 161
how the transaction was structured. Few such limitations applied when pir
the benefits were those of the larger, or acquiring, firm being used to car
offset the income of the acquired company, as was true, for example, prc
in several of the acquisitions by Penn Central that appear in our sample. op
The size of such benefits may actually be understated by focusing as5
on current tax carryforwards, since many firms with previous tax losses
and unused credits may also have "built-in" losses that will occur in
the future. For example, a firm with assets consisting of a depreciable 'PU
capitalgood that one year after purchase proved to be valueless will
still be entitled to depreciation deductions in subsequent years even of
without any cash flow from the asset. Such losses have already oc- ad
curred, in economic terms, but not for tax purposes. ta
It has often been suggested that the presence of unused tax benefits rn
does not constitute an incentive to merge because firms can dispose ha
of them in other ways, including leasing and reducing debt. The premise co
of the "safe harbor" leasing provisions introduced briefly in 1981 was ba
to facilitate such transfers, in part to reduce the possible incentives to of
merge (Warren and Auerbach 1982). Nevertheless, the magnitude of wi
unused tax benefits, and the persistence of firms in states that offer wi
such benefits, suggests that the costs to such alternative activities must du
be large enough to discourage their use in an important number of fe
cases.
Step-Up in Asset Basis
Many companies carry assets on their books with a basis for tax in
purposes equal to a small fraction of their replacement cost. Such to
assets, if depreciable, provide a small fraction of the depreciation at-
lowances available on equally productive, newly purchased capital,
including used assets that are resold. Hence, resale provides a channel bi
for increasing such allowances. Opposing this potential tax gain is the
tax that must be paid when an asset is sold. Under prior law the seller in
in a normal asset sale had to pay some combination of capital gains w
and ordinary income taxes on the difference between the sale price U
and the basis, making such sales by corporations generally unprofitable ci
for tax purposes (Gordon, Hines, and Summers 1987). ai
Under the "general utilities" doctrine, however, liquidating distri- b
butions of assets to shareholders were exempt from the capital gains
portion of this tax liability. These distributions occur, for example, Ui
when one corporation acquires another and then liquidates it. They Ui
can also occur without an acquisition, with the corporation simply s
distributing its assets to its individual shareholders. This example has a
led some observers (such as Gilson, Scholes and Wolfson 1988) to argue
that the tax advantage to liquidations does not constitute a tax benefit
associated with the act of merging. Although we are aware of no em- is161 TheEffects of Taxation on the Merger Decision
en piricalevidence on this issue, it seems plausible that there are many
to cases in which the transaction costs of such liquidations would be
le, prohibitive, particularly when the value of the firm as a continuing




,iii The theory of optimal capital structure offers no easy explanation
en of the choice of debt-equity ratios in the presence of a substantial tax
advantage to debt. Except for Miller's (1977) theory that the individual
tax advantages to equity entirely offset the corporate advantage to debt,
Lts most hypotheses about optimal capital structure involve individual firms
se having interior optimal debt-equity ratios determined by the increasing
se costs to leverage associated, for example, with increased expected
as bankruptcy costs, increased agency costs, or the increased probability
to of tax losses. In these models the firm's costs of leverage may increase
of with the variance of its earnings, since that variance may be associated
with a higher probability of bankruptcy and tax losses. Thus, the re-
1st duction of idiosyncratic risk, which would produce no value in a per-
of fectly competitive model with efficient securities markets, could increase
value directly through a reduction in total bankruptcy costs and in the
frequency of tax losses and indirectly through the reduced marginal
costs of borrowing. It is therefore possible to derive models without
independent managerial motives in which it is optimal for firms to merge
to reduce their own risk, with the models also suggesting that these
ii- combinations would involve increased leverage.
Another way in which borrowing could encourage takeovers would
ci be if one of the manifestations of the "bad management" leading to
takeovers is an overly cautious debt policy. Because of the differing
er incentives of shareholders and managers, it is plausible that managers
is would choose to borrow less than a value-maximizing amount since
the risks associated with low earnings or bankruptcy might be more
le costly to managers than to shareholders. If the incumbent managers
are too risk averse, for example, new management could increase value
because of its decision to borrow more.
is In addition, of course, one would expect increases in borrowing to
e, the extent that takeovers increase value by improving management or
the utilization of assets, since these activities essentially increase the
ly scale of the firm, presumably lowering the marginal borrowing cost for
tS a given absolute level of debt. But unlike the first two cases, this would
not necessarily lead to increased debt-equity ratios, nor would it be
associated with a particular type of merger, such as one in which risk
is reduced or the target initially has a low debt-equity ratio.162Alan J. Auerbach and David Reishus 163
6.2.2Shareholder Taxation value
There are two primary ways in which acquired firms' shareholders before
receive payment: shares in the parent (or combined) company, or cash. the as
The mode of payment may affect the use of corporate tax benefits. In these
addition, however, the tax treatment of shareholders depends on the increi
form of payment. If the shareholders receive cash, they are normally
taxed on their capital gains. If they receive shares, they may be taxed, by co
but the firms may structure the transaction as a reorganization and the i'
thereby defer shareholder taxation until the new shares are sold. Each years
type of transaction has potential tax benefits beyond the corporate
benefits already discussed. of th
In nontaxable stock transactions, shareholders typically receive shares virtu
in a larger, more diversified enterprise in exchange for shares repre- taxal
senting a much larger fraction of a smaller company, a process that
can result in creating a more balanced portfolio without the capital for a
gains taxes usually attendant upon such a move. In taxable cash trans-
uicla
actions the acquiring firm distributes cash out of the corporate form at a
capital gains tax rates. In models of corporate equity policy that explain This
the existence of dividends through constraints on such behavior (which the 1
also encompasses the repurchase of a company's own shares), this suci
kind of activity may produce value because the values of the firms are t e
depressed by the anticipation that the acquired firm's value can reach
crec
shareholders only through fully taxed dividends (see, for example,
thai
Auerbach 1979; Bradford 1981; King 1974). A recent paper by King
(1986) estimates an aggregate model attempting to explain merger be-
(tO
havior in the United Kingdom as the result of such a process.
the
6.3Previous Fmdings be
In our two previous papers we examined a sample of 318 mergers
and acquisitions that took place during the years 1968—83.' The sample 6.4
consistedof all mergers and acquisitions in which both firms were on
the 1983 Compustat Industrial File or the 1983 Compustat Industrial
.
ResearchFile and for which usable tax data could be obtained from tb
the companies' annual reports and 10-K filings with the Securities and an
Exchange Commission. Just over three-quarters of these combinations Ifl(
came about between 1976 and 1982. The parent companies had an an
average value of equity plus long-term debt of $1 .957 billion (before
the acquisition), while the average targeted firm's value was just over bil
one tenth of this, or $204 million. b)
Our estimates (in Auerbach and Reishus l988a) suggested that tax ac
benefits realizable through increased use of tax losses and credits were ta
potentially present in about 20 percent of the mergers, with an average163 TheEffects of Taxation on the Merger Decision
value of just over 10 percent of the target's market value in the year
before the merger. We found smaller evident benefits from stepping up
the asset basis, but we encountered substantial difficulty in estimating
these benefits. Perhaps most surprising, though we found noticeable
increases in the absolute combined level of debt, we found negligible
he increases in combined debt-equity ratios (calculated before the merger
Ily bycombining the debt and equity values for the separate firms) over
the period beginning two years before the merger years and ending two
nd years after.
ch In our second paper we focused on the relationship between the form
te of the transaction and the type of tax benefits available. We found that
virtually all transactions were either nontaxable stock transactions or
es taxable cash transactions, the majority being of the first type. This
e- point is significant because in nontaxable transactions the firm has opted
a for a corporate reorganization, which generally cannot include a liq-
a uidation and step-up of asset bases. Under a taxable transaction either
Si a liquidation with a step-up or a transfer of tax attributes may be chosen.
This suggests that taxable transactions might be more common when
the potential basis step-up benefits are large, but we could identify no
such relationship, perhaps in part because of our inability to measure
re the benefits precisely. Moreover, since the transfer of tax losses and
credits is also treated somewhat differently under a taxable transaction
e than under a tax-free reorganization, there could be cases in which
1' firms opting for a transfer of tax benefits would still prefer the taxable
(to the shareholder) transaction. Thus, it is possible that firms would
be responsive to taxes in their merger planning without there being any
discernable relationship between the type of tax benefits available and
the form of the transaction. This leaves the merger decision itself to
be evaluated in assessing the importance of tax factors.
6.4 A Model of Mergers and Acquisitions
In this section we describe a simple model of mergers and acquisi-
tions. Though it is particularly well-suited to the questions we seek to
d answer, it is also applicable more generally. Hall (1988) uses a related
model in her study in this volume of the relationship between mergers
n and research and development.
e The model begins with several simplifying assumptions. Although
r billed as a marriage model, the marriage process is one not now favored
by most cultures, namely, polygamy. We assume that targets can be
x acquired only once within a year and that acquirers can seek as many
e targets as they wish. This latter assumption leads to a model of the
e "choice" made by prospective targets among alternative acquirers.164AlanJ. Auerbachand David Reishus 165
Weassume that in each year every potential parent, x, evaluates a TI
function, M(x,y), that indicates the joint gains to be had from acquiring a pa
a target, y. The function M(x,y) may take on negative values, since aggr
there may be substantial transaction costs involved in a successful Iogir
acquisition. If V0(y) is the value of y if it is not taken over, then firm targ
x will pay up to V0(y) +M(x,y)to acquire y. Thus, in a competitive asid
market fory, the firm with the highest valuation of y, say f, will acquire logi
yifM(x*,y) >0,forapricebetweenV0(y) +M(x*,y)and aggi
V0(y) +maxM(x',y). Note that the observed merger premium may be
less than M(x',y), since the possibility of a merger may have led the
prior price to exceed V0(y).
We assume that the function M(x,y) has the specification
son
(1) M(x,y) =
zincludes variables that relate only to the target, only
to the parent, or to both, andis a random disturbance representing (4)
benefits to the merger not observed by the investigator. Perhaps the
most crucial assumption we make is the one that leads to a tractable
empirical model. This is that the error term is uncorrelated with the
observed variables and takes on the extreme value distribution. Fol-
h lowing McFadden (1973), it is then possible to express the probability
W
thatwill acquire y as
(2) = + (5)
or,
which is a multinominal logit model of dimension N +I,where N is be
the number of potential parent firms and the extra dimension is added
by the possibility that no merger will occur. As is well known, the (6
multinomial logit model has certain strong properties, such as the in- A
dependence of irrelevant alternatives, which in this case seems justi- w
fiable. This property also simplifies the estimation procedure relative th
to an alternative approach, such as the multinomial probit. Even for a
multinomial logit, however, it is impractical to estimate a model of our lo
dimensions.
This estimation problem has been dealt with in the previous literature ai
in two ways. One approach is to include a small sample of the alter-
natives. In the current model this would mean that each observation 6
would involve a potential target and several, rather than all, potential
acquirers. For our model this estimation approach would pose prob-
lems. Many of the parent firm characteristics that appear in the vector t(
z, such as industry dummy variables, occur relatively infrequently in P
the population. Thus, it might be necessary to include a relatively large fi
number of alternative parents to achieve adequate sampling, a
L165The Effects of Taxation on the Merger Decision
s a The alternative estimation approach is to treat all combinations with
ng a particular target, except one, as an aggregate "all other" state. This
ice aggregation is not straightforward because of the nonlinearity of the
ful logistic specification. Suppose that for the observation of a potential
target firm y the "all other" state includes all possible combinations
ye aside from the one with potential parent x1. To convert the multinomial
ire logit specification (2) into a tnnomial logit, one must then define the




Consider a second order Taylor expansion of the function f(S)around
some constant value a for each of its N —Iarguments. After a couple





whereis the mean of I2,.. .N.By choosing a = one
ty can rewrite statement (4) (since the last term on the right-hand side
vanishes) as
(5) .., In(N —I)+ +
or, letting fl be the matrix whose ijth element is the sample covariance
is between independent variables i and j,
(6) ln(N—1) + +
1- Asargued by McFadden (1984), this approximate specification is exact
1- when the elements of the vector z are joint normally distributed, for
'e then the higher moments of the Taylor approximation vanish.
a This second approach to estimating a high-dimension multinomial
ir logit is well suited for our problem because the sample means and
variances of the independent variables of our model are easily estimated
C and have an intuitive economic interpretation.
6.5Sampling and Data Preparation
- Theliterature on mergers and acquisitions contains several attempts
r to estimate the factors leading to firms' being taken over (for example,
Palepu 1986) by examining the differences between firms acquired and
firms not acquired. By looking at merger pairs, rather than just targets,
and including firms that were not acquired in the estimation procedure,
.166Alan J.Auerbachand David Reishus 167
itshould, in principle, be possible to distinguish factors that affect the lead t
probability of a firm's being acquired from those that determine the disco'
actual match that occurs. The acquisition probability should be influ- paren
enced by target-specific variables that enter both branches of the model merg4
just outlined, while the actual match should be influenced by variables of pr
that depend on the actual pairing of the potential target and parent. incid
This is quite important in the current context, where the tax benefits more
available from a merger depend not only on the tax status of the po- for tl
tential target but also on the ability of the potential acquirer to use of ta
these benefits. If mergers occur for tax reasons, one would not expect
the firms acquired by Penn Central to have the same tax characteristics
as those acquired by IBM. As
To the 316 observations we had on firms that were acquired, we the p
added a similar number of observations of firms chosen at random from of a
the Compustat universe of firms, according to the following stratified one-
sampling method.2 For each actual merger, we created a corresponding for t
"pseudomerger" by selecting a "pseudotarget" firm from all firms in To p
the same size class and year as the target, and a "pseudoparent" firm five-
from all firms in the same size class and year as the real acquirer. The T
sample of pseudomergers therefore looks almost identical to the actual marl
merger sample in terms of size and year, but it may differ with respect Sinc
to other variables of interest. mea
For each observation we constructed variables for the target-parent
7 pair and then constructed corresponding variables for the aggregate
"all other" pairs according to expression (6). The variables were either wh
taken directly or constructed from raw data provided by the Compustat and
files or the annual reports and 10-K filings. exr
We employed this particular sampling method for two reasons. Al- the
though the optimal sampling scheme is uncertain, it has been suggested we
that an equal number of different alternatives is a good rule of thumb pre
for minimizing variance of estimates when the sample size is limited sor
(Cosslett 1981). The need to obtain from microfiche the tax information to
for each observation served to limit our own ability to expand the
sample. The reason for stratifying the sample by size and year is to Pai
match closely the mergers and pseudomergers by variables that may A
beimportant but not of direct interest. Perhaps more importantly, this par
stratification serves to limit the unwanted effects of unobserved van- do
ables correlated with year and size, as well as the direct effects of time
and relative size that we would be unable to specify exactly. What we sat
gain in precision in our variables of interest we lose in determining the I
effect of time and relative size on merger activity, of
pr(
6.5.1Nontax Vanables ne:
To test the importance of tax factors, it is necessary to control for
the other factors likely to affect mergers. Not doing so would certainly mi
L167 The Effectsof Taxation on the Merger Decision
the lead to incorrect conclusions.For example, in our previous work we
the discoveredthat there were ninecases in the316mergers in which both
flu- parent and target were tax constrained.Most of these,however,were
del mergers of two firms within asingleindustry, where a high correlation
les of profitability would leadonetoexpect apositive correlation of the
nt. incidence of tax constraints. Thus, if firms in the same industry are
fits more likely to merge than firms in different industries, not controlling
p0- for this factor could lead to a downward bias in the estimated impact
ise of tax factors.
ect
Target-Specific Variables
As discussed above, target-specific variables are those which affect
we the probability of a firm's being taken over, rather than the probability
of a specific merger. We include dummy variables for the target firm's
ed one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry, to account
ng for the fact that mergers might relate to overall industry conditions.
in To pick up growth-related merger motives, we include the target firm's
in five-year geometric growth rate of sales.
he To gauge management competence, we would like a measure of the
•al market value of the firm to the replacement cost value of its assets.
ct Since firm assets include assets beyond those included in capital stock
measures, we suppose that each firm's true capital stock takes the form
(7) K =K1+
er where K1 is the fixed capital stock, a, is a parameter to be estimated,
at and 5, is a proxy for intangible assets, such as research and development
expenditures or advertising. This statement leads to the inclusion of
the variables K1 —Vand S,, where V is the firm's market value, which
we approximate by the market value of equity at the close of the
Lb previous year plus the book value of the firm's financial liabilities. In
some specifications these variables are expressed as ratios with respect
to market value.
Pair-Specific Variables
Among the pair-specific variables we include dummy variables if the
is parent and target are in the same industry. Because it is unclear how
close two firms must be for them to be in the "same" industry, we
e specify three dummy variables, equal to one if the two firms are in the
e same one-digit, two-digit, and four-digit SIC industries, respectively.
e Finally, we specify two dummy variables based on the relative size
of the two firms. The "same size" dummy variable equals one if the
prospective parent firm is in the same size class as the target or the
next higher size class (these classes are defined in section1 of the
r appendix). For example, if the target firm had a market value of $200
y million, this variable would equal one for a parent with value between168Alan J. Auerbach and David Reishus 169
$100 million and $500 million. The second size dummy, for "larger to e
size," equals one if the parent is in one of the next two higher size The
classes; in the example, this would be a firm with a value between $500 equ
million and $5billionin assets. Both dummy variables equal zero only We
if the parent is substantially larger than the target (or much smaller, hot
though this event does not occur in the data set). mci
6.5.2TaxVariables
firr
There are several variables we consider to be tax-related. The first vat
is the target firm's debt-equity ratio. As suggested above, this could an
indicate the presence of a potential for increasing interest deductions, the
We would have preferred to include other variables potentially related hig
to borrowing, such as the reduction in risk, but data on the covariance (sil
of firm earnings were not available or even estimable from the data we
had. 6.5
The remaining variables are pair-specific. The first is the estimated
tax gain available from stepping up the basis of the target's assets.
Because equipment sales and liquidations are subject to recapture at wi
ordinary income tax rates, the main gains to be had from avoiding tio
capital gains taxes should be those associated with structures and de- oti
pletable resources. The appendix describes the algorithm used to es-
timate these gains. Given the assumptions necessary to make these
calculations, the estimates are subject to substantial error and could fo
greatly understate the potential gains in cases where the targeted firm
has assets that have been on its books for many years or have appre- 01
ciated in value at a rate in excess of the inflation rate, or both.
The appendix also describes the method used to estimate the gains d
from the use of tax credits and tax losses. We assume such gains to be
zero unless one of the firms is fully taxable and the other is tax con- ii
strained. This is a conservative assumption, since there should be some a
gains in any case where the taxable income of the two firms is not
perfectly correlated. These gains are hard to measure, however, and
arguably too small to have an impact on merger decisions. Where the 0
tax gain is positive, it is calculated under the assumption that the firm ai
with tax benefits becomes a shell after the merger, generating neither C
positive nor negative taxable income, and that the taxable firm uses a
these benefits to the extent that the law permits. Here, we ignore the g
additional restrictions that might apply to the full use of benefits in o
particular cases, because of our inability to identify such cases. a
The remaining tax variables have to do with the shareholder tax p
incentives for cash acquisitions. Here we are limited by the absence o
of a clear theory about the constraints firms face in avoiding dividend b
taxes. If share repurchases are costly, then, as discussed above, a firm c
wishing to distribute cash in excess of dividends will have the incentive
L169 TheEffects of Taxation on the Merger Decision
Lrger to engage in cash acquisitions in addition to repurchasing its own shares.
size The same incentive would not be present for a firm already issuing new
$500 equity,since cash acquisitions could not be financed by internal funds.
We therefore would expect constrained firms to be more likely to engage
both in share repurchases and cash acquisitions. This suggests that we
include dummy variables indicating whether the parent or pseudoparent
firm has repurchased its own shares in the past two years and whether
it has sold common equity in the past two years (in excess of threshold
first values of 4 percent of the firm's shares). In an earlier study (Auerbach
uld and Reishus 1988b) we did indeed find that, among firms that acquire,
ns. the probability of using cash as a means of payment is (insignificantly)
ted higher for firms that have recently repurchased their own shares and
rice (significantly) lower for those that have recently issued new shares.
'we
6.5.3Calculation of Variables for the Aggregate Alternative
ted For each observation it is necessary to calculate the values of each
of the above variables that correspond to the state representing a merger
at with one of "all other" potential parent firms. The only new calcula-
ing tions needed, however, are those for pair-specific variables, since the
de- others have a value that is independent of the characteristics of the
es- potential parent.
For each pair-specific variable the sample mean must be estimated
ild for inclusion in the vector z,,,andthe sample covariance matrixis
mi needed as well. For the dummy variables the mean is simply the fraction
re- of the population in that category (defined to be all firms of equal or
greater size). For example, the mean corresponding to the "same in-
IriS dustry"dummy variable is the fraction of potential parent firms in the
be target's industry. The covariance term between dummy variables equals
'fl. thedifference between the fraction of the sample satisfying both char-
1W acteristics and the fraction that would be predicted by multiplying the
lot sample means of each dummy variable.
rid For the continuous tax variables the aggregate calculations are based
he on the simplifying assumption that the value is either zero or a constant
Th amountbased on the parent firm's tax status not being affected by
er combining with the target. For example, a firm with tax losses that
es acquires a profitable firm retains excess losses after offsetting the tar-
get's taxable income, and a taxable parent firm uses all the tax benefits
Lfl ofthe target. This is quite reasonable given the relative sizes of acquired
and acquiring firms. Once this value, say T,iscalculated for each
potential target firm, the aggregate mean is calculated as the product
of this variable and the fraction of firms in the state where the tax
d benefit can be used (taxable if the target is nontaxable, and tax-
constrained if the target is taxable). The covariance term of this variable
e with the same-industry dummy, for example, equals the fraction of all
4170Alan .1. Auerbach and David Reishus 171
firms in the same industry and the opposite tax state of the potential Tabi
target, less the product of the same industry fraction and the opposite —
taxstate fraction, all multiplied by the magnitude of the tax benefit.
6.6Results
Before turning to the model estimates themselves, it is useful and 0
informative to compare selected statistics for the two samples of firm <
pairs, those that actually merged and those that did not.
Table 6.1 presents mean changes in debt-value ratios for the two
samples, broken down further by the relative sizes of target and parent. Fra
For actual mergers the change is measured by subtracting the ratio of
the two firms' debt to those firms' debt plus equity two years before
the merger year from the same ratio for the surviving firm two years —
afterthe merger. Because of data problems, only long-term debt (at Not
bookvalue) is used in the calculation. The four-year period is used to
distinguish "long run" leverage changes from those that might occur
only temporarily around the merger date. For the pseudomergers the
combined ratio is used for both dates in computing the change.
The results in table 6.1 cast doubt on the association of mergers with ca
increases in indebtedness. For only two of the five groups does the th
difference in means have the "right" (positive) sign, and for neither of a
these classes (or for the total sample) is the difference significant. Only m
for the class where the targets are roughly equal in size to the parents
CT
is there any discernible change in leverage, and here there are too few
observations to draw any conclusions. This does suggest that data from
the post-1983 period, which involved many more acquisitions of large
firms, would be useful to examine. Ii
ir
Table6.1 Mean Changes in Debt-Value Ratios, from Two Years before to si



















































Note: Relativetarget sizeisthe ratio of the target's value (debt plus equity) to the
parent's value in the year before merger. The total number of firms is somewhat lower
than the overall sample size because of missing data. The f-statistics are for a test of
equality of means. Means are unweighted within each cell.
a
e
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Table 6.2 Potential Gains fromthe Transferof Losses and Credits
Size
Actual Mergers(N= 316) Pseudomergers (N = 291)
From From From From
of Gain Total Target Parent Total Target Parent
0 255 235
<.05 26 19 7 23 16 7
.05—10 II 7 4 10 7 3
.10—25 14 9 5 17 9 8
>.25 10 3 7 6 4 2
Fraction with gain .193 .120 .073 .192 .123 .069
Mean gains:
Unweighted .170 .126 .242 .112 .108 .113
Weighted .105 .049 .163 .078 .058 .100
Note: Gains are expressed as a fraction of the target firm's value (long-term debt plus
equity). Mean gains are for those pairs with positive gains, with target firm's values used
when weighting.
Table6.2 presents estimates of the potential tax gains from the trans-
fer of tax losses and credits between parent and target. Again, the
calculations are done for both actual mergers and pseudomergers. For
the real mergers just under one-fifth of the pairs exhibit a tax gain, with
a mean weighted gain of 10.5 percent of the target's market value. This
mean is larger than the estimate given in our earlier paper, in which a
cruder method was used to calculate the gain. There are fewer cases
where the gain comes from the parent, but the average gain in these
cases is estimated to be much larger. The incidence of tax benefits
among the pseudomergers is remarkably similar, a result that suggests
the transfer of tax losses and credits may not be an important factor
in the merger decision. There is a noticeable difference between the
samples, however, in the magnitude of gains coming from cases in
which the parent firm has unused tax losses or credits. These gains are
on average much lower for the pseudomerger sample than for the actual
merger sample. Distinguishing the source of the tax gain may, therefore,
be important in the estimation procedure.
The estimated gains from the target's basis step-up are given in table
Once again the differences between the two samples are negligible.
Further, based on our very imperfect measurement technique, the es-
timated potential tax benefits from basis step-up are quite small, av-
eraging only about 2 percent of the target's value and exceeding 5
percent in only 7.8 percent of both real mergers and pseudomergers.
We turn next to the estimates of the full merger model. Results for
a variety of specifications are given in tables 6.4 and 6.5. The estimated
equations differ according to whether certain variables are expressed



















fTable 6.3 Potential Gains from Baais Step-Up
Size of Gain Actual Mergers(N281) Pseudomergers (N= 245)
< .05 259 226






Note: Gains are expressed as a fraction of the target firm's value. The total number of
firms is somewhat lower than the overall sample size because of missing data.
Table 6.4 presents estimates based on the level specification, while
those in table 6.5 are for the ratio form. The theoretical model intro-
duced in section 6.5 does not allow us to determine in advance which
of these specifications is to be preferred.
A number of variables are robust and quite significant in all the
specifications. These include the target's debt-value ratio, which has
a positive effect on the probability of a firm's being acquired; the
target's sales growth rate; and the same-industry dummy variables,
especially- that for the four-digit SIC industry. The fact that each of the
same-industry dummy variables is always positive suggests that firms
are more likely to merge the closer their industrial relationship. The
increasing magnitude of the same industry coefficients as one moves
from the one-digit to the four-digit variable means that the incremental
effect is also increasing: Being in the same four-digit industry relative
to the same two-digit industry has more of an effect on the merger
probability than being in the same two-digit industry, as opposed to
the same one-digit industry, for example. The results for the industry
dummy variables are interesting but not unexpected; nor is the per-
formance of the sales growth term, given a similar finding by Palepu
(1986). The influence of the debt-value ratio, however, is quite sur-
prising, given the argument that firms with unused debt-capacity are
more likely to be taken over. One possible explanation is that firms
with high debt are firms in trouble, though other variables included in
the regression are intended to control for this characteristic.
The industry dummy variables for the target suggest that (relative
to the omitted industries, those with SIC codes beginning with 8, which
include health, education, and engineering) in only two broad industry
groups were firms more likely to be acquired during the period in
question: transportation, communication, and utilities; and to a lesser
extent finance, insurance, and real estate;
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Constant 11.50 11.50 10.62
(18.35) (18.33) (6.29)
Target'sdebt-value ratio 3.64 3.64 2.72
(5.04) (5.03) (2.80)
Target'ssales growth rate 1.99 1.98 2.75
(2.28) (2.27) (2.25)
Same one-digit SIC 1.45 1.45 1.47
(1.68) (1.67) (0.79)
Sametwo-digit SIC 2.34 2.34 3.38
(1.98) (1.96) (2.29)
Samefour-digit SIC 6.60 6.60 6.95
(7.54) (7.51) (9.11)
Samesize parent — .61 — .61 — .55
(—.92) (—.91) (—.66)
Largersize parent .36 .36 .50
(.55) (.55) (.58)
New shares issued —.07 —.06 .22
(—.12) (—.11) (.35)
Shares repurchased —.85 —.85 —.86
(—1.26) (—1.26) (—1.01)
Tax gains .20 — —
(3.24)
Tax gain target5 — — .09 — .60
(—.13) (—.54)
Taxgainparent — .22 .22
(3.40) (2.04)
Basisstep-up5 —3.10 —3.07 —1.13
(—1.97) (—1.85) (—1.34)
Target's book-market value5 — .05 — .05 — .07
(—.57) (—.56) (—.72)
Target's advertising5 .03 .05 .33
(.03) (.03) (.16)
Target'sR&D5 —.92 —.97 —1.11
(—.56) (—.56) (— .36)
Target's industry dummy variables
(one-digitSIC)




3. (Durable goodsmanufacturing) 1.15
(.67)Level Specification
(2) (3) (I) Independent Variable
4.(Transportation, communication, — —
and utilities)
5. (Retail sales) — —
6. (Finance, insurance, and real — —
estate)
7. (Services) — —
Note:Dependentvariable =Iif merger occurs; f-statistics are in parentheses.













































































Table 6.5 Logit Model Estimation Results
Independent Variable Ratio Specification
Constant
Target's debt-value ratio












Tax gain target' — — .02 —.90
(—.05) (—.69)
Tax gain parent' — 1.75 1.93
(.34) (.38)
Basis step-up' —6.90 —6.40 10.82
(— .89) (— .82) (2.55)
Target's book-market value' .26 .32 .44
(.81) (.94) (.95)
Target's advertising' —1.88 —1.94 —1.59
(—1.18) (—1.22) (—.69)
Target's R&D' —7.46 —7.49 —4.03
(—2.67) (—2.68) (—1.31)
Target's industry dummy variables
(one-digit SIC)
I. (Mining and resource extraction) 1.76
(1.01)
2. (Nondurable goods manufacturing) 1.47
(.89)
3. (Durable goods manufacturing) 1.11
(.68)
4. (Transportation, communication, 4.87
and utilities) (2.60)
5. (Retail sales) .90
(.54)























Note: Dependentvariable =Iif merger occurs; f-statistics are in parentheses. in "ratio"
specifications the variables with asterisks are divided by the target firm's market value.176 Alan J. Auerbach and David Reishus
Certainother variables are also robust to the choice of specification
andalwaysinsignificant. These include the new share and repurchase r
variables andtheparent size variables. The pattern of the size variables
suggests that a firm is most likely to acquire other firms that are smaller s
than itself, but not too much smaller. This is consistent with our ob-
servation (Auerbach and Reishus 1988a) that parents are typically larger
than the targets they acquire but that relative size is The
repurchase variable has the "wrong" sign in that it suggests firms that t
have repurchased are less likely to acquire other firms. This result does
not necessarily constitute evidence against the "trapped equity" in-
ducement for cash mergers. It may simply mean that firms wishing to
get excess cash out of the corporate form tend to specialize in their
method, either repurchasing or engaging in cash acquisitions. If this
specialization were strong enough, the observation of a firm repur-
chasing would reduce the expectation that it would also engage in a
cash merger, even though, conditional on its decision to acquire, it
would still be more likely to use cash (as suggested by our previous
results cited above). This problem of interpretation underscores the
need for a more rigorous model of the constraints that cause equity to
be "trapped" and the optimal behavior of firms in response to these
constraints.
The performance of the remaining variables, including the tax vari-
ables, depends on the model specification. The tax gain variable always
has the correct sign and is significant in the level specification. But
when this variable is broken down into two variables according to the
source of the tax gains (target or parent), only the tax gains from the
potential parent are significant in the level specification. This is entirely
consistent with the results given in table 6.2, where the only noticeable
difference between the sample of real mergers and that of pseudo-
mergers was for the case of parent-related tax gains. Moreover, it is
plausible that the tax benefits of the target firm would present less of
an incentive because of the additional restrictions on their use that we
have not taken into account.
Despite this statistical significance, however, the tax variable for the
parent is of little economic importance. Depending on the exact spec-
ification, setting the value of the parent's tax gain to zero (which sim-
ulates the impact of a policy change making the transfer of such benefits
impossible) reduces the predicted number of mergers by between just
under 1 percent and just over 1.5 percent. In contrast, the predicted
number of mergers would be reduced by well over one-half by setting
the same-industry (at the four-digit level) dummy variable equal to zero
(which simulates the impact of a policy of prohibiting combinations of
firms in the same four-digit industry occurring with a frequency that
cannot be explained by other factors).
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The basis step-up variable is disturbingly sensitive to whether the
e ratio or the level specification is used and to whether industry dummy
variables are included. In the level specification it always has the wrong
r sign. In the ratio specification it has the wrong sign in the two speci-
fications without industry dummies but is significant and has the pre-
r dicted sign with the industry dummies present. If this last model were
correct, the predicted decline in mergers associated with a removal of
the tax benefits from basis step-up would be over 8 percent, much
s larger than the predicted impact of removing the ability to transfer
losses and credits. Nonetheless, the instability of this variable's per-
formance and the problems in its construction lead us to discount the
r importance of this result.
The results for the remaining three variables, which are intended to
measure the difference between market value and the value of asset,
are also sensitive to whether level or ratio form is used. Under the
t former all three are quite insignificant. Under the latter the gap between
book and market value has the correct sign and is significant, while
the R&D variable has the wrong sign and is significant. It should be
pointed out, however, that this sign for R&D is "wrong" in a very
limited sense, if R&D affects the merger probability only through its
use in correcting our measure of the firm's asset replacement cost. If
R&D spending exerts an independent influence on the probability of a
firm's acquisition, it is not clear without further, modeling what sign
one should expect it to have.
In summary, then, the basic model specification seems good in that
the variables one associates with acquisitions, such as industry rela-
tionship and growth, are consistently significant. The significance of
the debt-value ratio is also quite robust, through we are not certain
how this is to be explained. In light of the results in table 6.1, however,
it is hard to argue that acquisitions by large corporations were driven
during this period by the opportunity to tap unused target debt ca-
pacity.5 The performance of the tax gain variable suggests a mild,
positive effect of tax losses and credits experienced by the potential
acquirer, but little effect of those experienced by the potential target.
Finally, the basis step-up variable, whose accuracy we have questioned,
is of the correct sign (but significant) in only one specification. The
values of the likelihood function for the ratio and level specifications
are virtually identical, making it difficult to decide which model de-
scribes the data best.
6.7Conclusion
The object of this paper has been to consider the impact of taxes on
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theyears 1968—83. To do this, we have compared the tax characteristics ass
of a sample of merging firms to those of a similar sample of nonmerging to
firms chosen at random and, using both samples, estimated a "mar- mit
riage" model of merger activity. Our results suggests that the potential tax
increase in interest deductions could not have been an important factor
influencing merger activity during the period in question. The two sam- tax
pies exhibit very insignificant differences in borrowing patterns, and the
the logit model estimates suggest that a lower debt-equity ratio is as- wil
sociated with a lower probability that a firm will be acquired.
Likewise, the tax benefits associated with acquiring a firm having we
tax losses or unused tax credits appear to exert an insignificant influ-
ence on merger activity. The frequency and size of the tax benefits are
virtually the same in the actual merger sample and the pseudomerger At
sample, and the size of the potential benefit has no explanatory power of
in the merger model. One reason for this may be the existence of a pr
variety of restrictions on the use of the tax benefits that, because of wI
their complexity, we have ignored in our analysis. in
The two potential tax benefits that do appear to have some impact in
on merger activity are the use of tax losses and credits by acquiring sh
companies to offset the taxable income of the firms they acquire and wi
the option to step up the basis of the assets of the acquired firms without be
paying corporate capital gains taxes. The first of these is significant in
some of the model estimates and is more important in the sample of
real mergers than in the sample of pseudomergers. Even so, it is of
little economic importance in explaining the frequency of mergers. The
second potential benefit is significant in one of the specifications esti-
mated, but it has the unexpected sign in all others. Given the difficulty It
we have encountered in measuring this variable accurately, we are
somewhat suspicious of this finding of potential significance.
As to the avoidance of individual taxes, we have found that firms S
that repurchased their own shares in the previous two years are less
likely to acquire other firms. This result is hard to reconcile with the a
theory that firms seek cash acquisitions to free "trapped equity" with- a
out a rigorous model of the constraints on and determinants of repur- I
chase activity. 5
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 attempted to discourage tax-driven
acquisitions by repealing the "general utilities" doctrine, which per- 2
mitted the tax-free basis step-up, and by limiting the acquirer's use of a
the tax losses and credits of the acquired firm. Our findings suggest
that the latter restriction is of little importance. Ironically, the use of
the acquirer's tax benefits, which appears to have some impact on
merger activity, was not restricted by the recent legislation. A change C
that, some have argued, could encourage mergers is the strengthening C
of the corporate alternative minimum tax. Just as with the asymmetry I
L
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Cs associated with gains and losses, it will be possible for firms subject
to the minimum tax to combine with taxable firms not subject to the
minimum tax and reduce combined tax payments. But the potential
al tax reductions would appear smaller (since the difference between the
two firms' marginal tax rates is lower) than for the combination of a
taxable and nontaxable firm. Given our findings about mergers between
these types of firms, we strongly doubt that the minimum tax provisions
will have a significant impact on merger activity.
The results in this paper should be regarded with caution because
• we had to make many assumptions to estimate the potential tax benefits
associated with particular mergers. Without access to the confidential
re tax returns of the firms involved, these assumptions were unavoidable.
er Another research limitation that deserves mention is the terminal date
er of our sample—early 1983. Since then, the character of the acquisition
a process has changed, with many more "megamergers" occurring in
which larger firms were acquired. There is some inconclusive evidence
in our table 6.1 that these mergers may, on average, be associated with
increases in leverage for the combined enterprise. Recent observations
should facilitate a more precise evaluation of this proposition, along
with the one that borrowing to finance acquisitions has, in general,





In this appendix, we describe the methods used for sampling and for
calculating the variables.
Sampling
The actual and "pseudo" samples were matched by year and by the
e assets of both parent and target. The methods for calculating assets
are explained below. The size categories were (in millions) 1—10,
r- 10—25, 25—50, 50—100, 100—250, 250—500, 500—1,000, 1,000—5,000,
5,000+, as well as a category for missing values. The missing values
n were eliminated for the regressions, which left 310 actual mergers and
291 pseudomergers. The difference is due to the inability to collect
meaningful tax or asset information on a portion of the pseudo mergers.
Gain from the Use of Tax Losses and Credits
This calculation uses information on the income tax paid, tax loss
e carryforward, and investment tax credit carryforward obtained from
g corporate reports. When a firm without carryforwards and positive tax
y payments combines with a firm that has carryforwards, we calculate
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the potential benefit. We assume that the unconstrained firms' level of Sir
tax payments grows at a 10 percent nominal rate into the future, while they
the firm with the loss carryforward contributes no new losses but also
no new taxable income in the future—it is simply a shell for holding more
tax loss carryforwards. We then calculate the net present value of the has
tax payments (discounted at 10 percent), combining the two firms' tax the
attributes through the period when the carryforward is used up or If
expires. The net present value of the tax payments of the two firms at ti
separately is also calculated using the same assumptions for the same deci
time period. The difference between the combined calculation and the date
sum of the separate calculations is the tax benefit. (A3)
The aggregate calculation is much cruder. If the target is paying
positive taxes, we use three times the tax payment as the tax gain from
merging with a parent that has a tax loss carryforward as indicated by
Compustat. For targets with tax losses we use the value of the actual whi
tax loss as the potential benefit for parents that do not have tax loss the•
carryforwards as indicated by Compustat. eas
der
Basis Step-Up C
We begin with the firm's book value of fixed assets at the end of the esti
last year before the merger. Using data on the firm's gross investment rec
and the capital stock at the end of the earliest year for which it is vat
available for the firm, we employ the "perpetual inventory" method bac
to estimate the rate of declining balance depreciation that is consistent del
with the firm's initial and terminal capital stocks. Given this estimate pn
of economic depreciation, we then estimate the current market value
of the capital stock by multiplying the capital remaining from different pr
vintages by the ratio of the price (represented by the GNP deflator) in ba
the current year to that for the year in which the capital was purchased: de
We also assume that the initial capital stock was valued correctly on tin
the firm books. That is, we solve forfrom the equation: th
an
(Al) KT= (1—&)TK0 +(I —6)T_+ ... + by
where K, is the book capital stock at the end of year t and I, is fixed St
investment in year t. We then calculate the market value of the capital
stock as flu
(A2) Kp =(1— + ...+IT. if
We assume that a fraction, 0, of this market value represents structures, A where 0 is the fraction that structures represent for all firms in the
same industry (taken from Auerbach 1983). Note that this operation
will understate the market value of assets that have increased in nominal fl
valueat a rate in excess of the GNP deflator or were worth more than
their book value even at time zero. ti181 The Effects ofTaxationon the MergerDecision
Since structures are written off at a different rate from equipment,
they will generally represent a different fraction of the book capital
stock than of the market value capital stock. Since structures decay
more slowly than equipment, the book fraction will be smaller: Inflation
has a greater effect on the ratio of the current value to book value as
the time since purchase increases.
If one assumes that the structures fraction of the firm's capital stock
at time zero was also 0, and that structures are written off at the
declining balance rate -y, it follows that the book value of structures at
date Tis
(A3) =0{K0(l— + [Kg' —K0(l+
—(1 —g+rr)(I —y)J/[I —(I —g+ir)T(l —y)r]
{[l —(I—g)T(1— — (1—g)(l—
whererr is the average inflation rate over the period 0 to 1', and g is
the nominal growth rate of investment in structures. These rates are
easily calculated for each firm. We set y =.033,the aggregate value
derived in Auerbach and Hines (1987).
Given the market value of the firm's structures capital stock, we
estimate the alter-tax value of depreciation allowances the firm would
receive by multiplying the corporate tax rate by the average present
value of depreciation allowances on all structures, estimated by Auer-
bach and Hines (1987). It is somewhat more difficult to estimate the
depreciation allowances the firm would receive if continuing along its
previous depreciation schedule, since its capital stock purchase dates
are unknown. We simply assume the allowances would have the same
present value as is available on new capital per each dollar of remaining
basis. Moreover, we assume that recapture will neutralize the additional
depreciation allowances received on increases in basis up to the straight-
line basis, and that this latter basis equals the actual book value. Thus,
the net estimated gain is the present value of the depreciation allow-
ances of new structures, multiplied by the corporate tax rate, multiplied
by the difference between the market and book value estimates for
structures.
For 35 real targets and 46 hypothetical targets the data were insuf-
ficient to perform the basis step-up calculations. For these firms we
use an imputed value equal to the sample average. Use of a separate
missing-value dummy variable did not substantively alter the results.
Asset Value
Based on Compustat data the value of a firm is calculated as the
market (year-end) value of common stock plus the book value of long-
term debt, short-term debt, and preferred stock in the year preceding
the merger. For an important fraction of targets a closing stock price182Alan J. Auerbachand David Reishus 183
was unavailable for that year; if the calculation provided a missing
value, we took this value from the previous year. c
Gil
Notes
1. We have since discovered problems with data for two of the mergers and
so report on only 316 observations in this paper. Go
2. There are actually 291 such observations because of data problems en- t
countered alter the second sample was chosen.
3. These are given for all targets and pseudotargets, including the relatively ft
small number matched with a nontaxable parent or pseudoparent that could
not use the tax benefits. In the estimation procedure below the potential gain Ki
is set to zero in such cases.
4. In all versions of the model estimates reported in the paper, we weight
each observation based on the sampling frequency of the target firm's size
M class as well as status (acquired or not acquired). In principle this is the correct
approach, although it gives some observations substantial weight. We also tried
an alternative weighting scheme that did not distinguish sample weights by
size. The coefficients for most variables were nearly identical, although one —
ofthe tax variables, the parent's tax gain, had its size reduced somewhat in
some specifications.
M 5. Needless to say, one cannot and should not interpret this finding as ap-
plying to the going-private leveraged buyouts that are not included in our
sample.
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Comment James M. Poterba
Auerbach and Reishus's paper is a first-rate empirical study of whether
tax synergies are significant determinants of the incidence and pattern
of corporate mergers. It is the first careful examination of the impact
of tax considerations on merger decisions. The authors find that the
probability that an actual merger yields corporate tax benefits is no
higher than the probability that a random pairing between two firms
will produce tax benefits. In conjunction with their discovery that sig-
nificant corporate tax benefits obtain in only one merger out of five,
these results cast doubt on the claim that taxes have induced a signif-
icant fraction of recent mergers.
James M. Poterba is associate professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.184Alan J.Auerbachand David Reishus 18
The authors' conclusion that taxes are an insignificant factor in the
merger process is consistent with recent discussions outside academia. fir.
In evaluating the potential impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on merger
activity, the head of the merger division at a major accounting firm
estimated that no more than 5 percent of all mergers are "tax driven" at
(Mergers and Acquisitions 1986, p. 10). Although this exceeds Auer- fo
bach and Reishus's estimate, the similarity between the two values is
encouraging. al
While I believe the general conclusion that taxes are not a critical
factor in explaining the growth of merger activity in the 1980s, I suspect
that Auerbach and Reishus may understate the importance of taxes in ai
the most recent mergers. Their sample period ends in early 1983. Three
developments since then may have increased the role of tax factors. ti
First, the number of firms with net operating losses and loss carry-
forwards rose substantially after 1981 because of the rapid asset write-
offs provided by the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) and the d
deep recession of 1982. The sample includes only one year of this new si
regime, when transactions designed to take advantage of tax losses
would be especially likely. The one post-1981 year included in the c
sample, 1982, may also differ from subsequent years because at that p
time firms were still permitted to use "safe harbor" leasing to transfer
tax benefits from tax loss firms to taxable firms. Second, the advent a
of the ACRS increased the incentive for selling assets to step up their ç
basis.Again, this effect would be strongest in the years after the au-
thors' sample period. Finally, the "junk bond" market became a much
more important part of the takeover process after 1982 (see Taggart
1988). Thus, by focusing on mergers that took place during the late
l960s and the 1970s, the authors may not capture the importance of
taxes in recent takeovers.
At the same time, however, some countervailing factors may lead
the authors to overstate the importance of taxes. I describe three po-
tential problems below and illustrate each by referring to tax loss carry-
forwards. Similar arguments could be made with respect to the other
tax incentives for merger.
The first potential problem arises in measuring the size of tax ben-
efits. Auerbach and Reishus implicitly assume that the tax benefit from
merging equals the face value of the resulting tax savings. They as-
sume, for example, that a firm with a tax loss carryforward (TLCF)
that was party to an acquisition would not have utilized it unless it
was involved in a takeover. This assumption probably overstates the
gain from merging because mergers are only one of the ways a firm
can benefit from a loss carryforward. TLCF firms could alternatively
issue new shares and use the proceeds to purchase bonds, generating
taxable interest income effectively taxed at the capital gains rate for
shareholders.
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e One could argue that many firms with TLCFs face substantial dif-
ficulty raising equity capital. This may be true. These firms might also
r find it difficult to locate merger partners, however. The relevant issue
concerns the alternative opportunities for those TLCF firms that are
attractive merger partners; these firms may have many other channels
for realizing some of their tax benefits. Similar arguments apply to tax
s gains from basis step-up and increased leverage (see Gilson, Scholes,
and Wolfson 1986). By assuming that the nonmerger alternatives yield
no tax benefits, the authors overstate the tax incentives to merge. Since
t they conclude that taxes are unimportant in the merger process, this
argument reinforces their results.
The second potential problem is one of measurement errors in es-
timated tax benefits. The previous argument implies that the merger
tax gains for many firms may be overstated. It does not necessarily
imply that errors of different magnitudes affect different firms. Such
differential errors may, however, be induced by the problems of mea-
suring both TLCFs and potential basis step-ups.
Financial statements provide an imperfect guide to a firm's tax loss
carryforwards. Auerbach and Poterba (1987) observed substantial dis-
parities between estimates of loss carryforwards based on Internal
Revenue Service data and those based on financial statements. An
additional problem in analyzing mergers comes from the idiosyncratic
character of tax benefits. The rules for utilizing loss carryforwards are
complex and have varied over time. The 1976, 1981, 1982, and 1986
Tax Reform Acts all affected the use of carryforwards in corporate
acquisitions. The simple assumption that taxable firms acquiring firms
with losses can use these losses may therefore induce substantial mea-
surement error.
Similar problems arise in calculating the potential gains from basis
step-up for individual firms. The authors use a sophisticated algorithm
based on average asset composition in each industry. Differences across
firms in asset decay rates, in the fraction of assets that have been sold
or acquired through takeovers, or even in the types of assets that are
used can make these estimates an unreliable guide to potential tax
benefits.
The real difficulty with the errors of measurement in both TLCFs
and potential basis step-ups is that they are likely to be correlated with
the dependent variable, an indicator variable for the presence or ab-
sence of a merger. Given two firms with identical estimated potential
tax benefits in an acquisition, there is a positive correlation between
the measurement error (true benefit minus measured benefit) and the
probability of observing a merger. This correlation may contaminate
• the statistical analysis.
The final problem, one of tax status endogeneity, arises because
there are no controlled experiments for analyzing how tax policy186Alan J. Auerbach and David Reishus 187
affects merger probabilities. We cannot endow an otherwise healthy anc
firm with a $100 million tax loss carryforward and study whether or par
not it is acquired. Rather, we must track how TLCFs generated by doi
previous corporate actions influence takeover probabilities. The dif- intl
ficulty with this approach is not confined to the Auerbach and Reishus by
paper; it affects virtually all cross-sectional studies of taxes and firm
behavior, in
The basic problem is that the presence of a TLCF may signal many thi
things. First, it indicates a potential tax benefit for an acquirer. Second, op
however, it may suggest that the firm has experienced severe business
difficulties. While an otherwise healthy firm with TLCFs might make tb
a very attractive acquisition target, the typical TLCF firm may in fact
be very unattractive. Finally, however, there is an opposite bias that
is stressed in practitioner accounts of the merger process. Firms with of
TLCFs have typically faced tight cash flow constraints in the recent ta
past, and they may have postponed high-return investment projects er
because of this. These firms may therefore be attractive takeover tar- ai
gets for reasons other than their tax status. Separating the direct (tax)
effectsof loss carryforwards from the other real effects correlated with b
them is extremely difficult. The authors control for the target's sales ai
growth rate, but this variable is unlikely to capture all of the relevant
aspectsof recentcorporateperformancethataffecttakeover
probabilities.
In spite of these three difficulties, I am still inclined to believe the
authors' basic findings. Their results suggest that certain types of cor-
porate tax benefits are not important explanators of recent merger
activity. The results do not imply, however, that taxes play a small role
in the takeover process. A casual reader of takeover trade publications,
such as Mergers and Acquisitions, discovers about one-fifth of the
articles are devoted to taxation. Can this be reconciled with the Auer-
bach and Reishus findings? It could be if there is relatively little money
to be made from the tax-related aspects of a merger but much to be
lost from incorrect tax planning. Tax considerations may therefore be
defensive, not offensive, aspects of acquisition activity.
Some contests for corporate control may also be driven by tax factors
besides the ones considered in the paper. Leveraged buyouts, for ex-
ample, have received substantial tax subsidies (see Shleifer and Vishny
1988), but they do not feature in Auerbach and Reishus's analysis of
mergers between two firms. King (1986) has proposed a "trapped eq-
uity" model of takeover activity, by which acquisitions provide a tax-
favored channel for transferring resources to shareholders. If King's
analysis is correct, the double-taxation of dividend income may partly
explain why firms engage in takeovers. In this volume Franks, Harris,187The Effectsof Taxation on the Merger Decision
and Mayer (1988) provide some evidence against this view by corn-
r paring methods of payment in the United States and the United King-
dom, but the argument is still important in explaining how taxes can
influence merger activity through channels other than those considered
by Auerbach and Reishus.
The results of this study suggest that corporate marriages are made
in heaven, not in the tax lawyer's office. Although that may seem like
the way it should be, this presumption may be seriously wrong. The
optimal tax policy toward corporate acquisitions depends upon a va-
riety of factors. If takeovers tend to promote efficient management,
the socially optimal policy may require provision of some tax benefits
for merging firms (see Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson, 1986). Such a
policy would generate an additional incentive for merging, potentially
offsetting the costs associated with the takeover process. If, however,
takeovers are largely conflicts between stake holders and "stake eat-
ers," as in the Shleifer-Summers (1988) analysis earlier in this volume,
and if they adversely affect economic performance, it may be appro-
priate to place a tax penalty on acquisitive firms. Research like that
by Auerbach and Reishus provides the empirical groundwork for future
analyses of the optimal taxation of corporate combinations.
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Comment John B. Shoven e
th
I like the idea for the Auerbach and Reishus paper—an assessment of
the importance of taxes in mergers. The authors review several the-
oretical tax rationales for mergers and then proceed to an empirical
examination of their effects. Before commenting on this study, how- vi
ever, I should mention there are aggregate facts about mergers that do ir
not seem to be related to tax factors. One is that merger activity is t2
markedly cyclical. It would be interesting to know whether there are
more firms with loss carryforwards or unused investment tax credits d
when merger activity is high than when it is low. Some relatively ag- b
gregate correlations between the tax factors and merger activity would tl
therefore have been interesting in Auerbach and Reishus's paper. I am s
skeptical that the correlations would be consistent with the tax theories, ti
but I have trouble determining whether I reached this prior before or ti
after peeking at the results of their paper.
The authors discuss three main ways taxes might affect the merger
decision. First, either the target or the acquirer may have unused loss
carryforwards and credits. Merging is a potential way of accelerating 0
their use and possibly salvaging them before they expire. Although this e
may provide an incentive to merge in some cases, the authors' earlier C
work had found that there was no transfer of carryforwards or credits
in slightly over 80 percent of the observed mergers between 1968 and
1983. In this paper, with their construction of hypothetical mergers to t
be compared with actual mergers, they find there is a tax carryover
transfer in 19.2 percent of the hypothetical mergers (versus 19.3 percent
for the actual mergers). The weighted average gain is higher for the
actual mergers, but this is largely because of the seven instances where
the gain resulting from offsetting the parent's unused losses and credits
exceeds 25percentof the target's value. Several of these seven in-
stances (there were only two such cases in the hypothetical merger
sample) may have resulted from the same parent (for example, Penn
1
Central).Certainly, the difference in the average gain between the real
mergers and the hypothetical ones is the result of a very small number
of cases with large gains. It is not at all clear that it is statistically
significant.
1
Certainly,the conclusion of this paper, and of the authors' earlier
work—namely, the use of tax carryforwards and credits cannot explain
most mergers because these factors are not present in over 80 percent
of mergers—is an important one. Even before engaging in high-power
John B. Shoven is professor of economics and chairman of the Department of Eco-
nomics at Stanford University and a research associate of the National Bureau of Eco-
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econometrics, the authors are left with only a relatively small role for
that theory in the merger decision.
of The second corporate tax theory regarding mergers is the step-up in
basis and the potential redepreciation of assets after a merger. This
al redepreciation is profitable only if the difference between the market
value and book value of acquired assets is not treated as fully taxable
income. Until recently, at least for plant, the gain was less than fully
is taxed and thus there was an incentive for redepreciation.
re Several severe problems arise in measuring with publicly available
•ts data the size of the potential tax advantage resulting from a step-up in
basis. Auerbach and Reishus do not have any information regarding
Id the market value of a firm's assets. Further, they do not know the age
m structure of the assets or what fraction of them are plant. The variable
they construct is presumably measured with considerable error, and
this may account for its failure to be significant in their merger
regressions.
The third theory, that the merged company can carry more debt than
the separate firms is questionable. The authors do not have information
on the variance of the target's earnings or on the covariance of those
is earnings with the parent's earnings. It seems very doubtful that the
observed debt-equity ratio of the target gives reliable information about
the extra debt-carrying capacity that the merger would permit. The
d authors'S finding that mergers are much more likely between firms in
) the same narrowly defined industry indicates that earnings-source di-
r versification and hence greater debt-carrying capacity are not important
determinants of mergers.
e I find the paper quite convincing that the tax theories are not the
e most important determinants of mergers. But I also believe the early
j tablescomparing the actual and hypothetical mergers convey that mes-
- sagequite adequately. Most researchers would have stopped right there
r and declared the result. The authors are to be admired for not letting
this deter them and proceeding to develop their logit "marriage" model
of mergers. The main result, however, is not fundamentally changed
by all their efforts. It still appears, much to the dismay of public finance
economists, that the tax factors are not of paramount importance in
the merger decision.7
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